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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ; 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 900560-CA 
v. : Priority No, 2 
FOSTER M. LEONARD, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for possession of 
equipment with intent to manufacture a controlled substance, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37c-8 
(Supp. 1991), and for conspiracy to manufacture a controlled 
substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 76-4-201 (1990) and 58-37-8 (Supp. 1991). This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(f) (Supp. 1991). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court 
correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence on the 
grounds that the investigatory stop of defendants' vehicle was 
supported by reasonable suspicion, that the subsequent search of 
defendants' vehicle was proper, that officers provided 
appropriate Miranda warnings prior to questioning defendants and 
that the affidavit in support of a search warrant for defendants' 
residence was sufficient to establish probable cause. Because 
the trial court is in the best position to assess witness 
credibility in a motion to suppress hearing, this Court "will not 
disturb its factual assessment underlying a decision to . . . 
deny a suppression motion unless it clearly appears that the 
lower court was in error." State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284, 285 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). A trial court's findings are not clearly 
erroneous unless they are either against the clear weight of the 
evidence, or this Court reaches a "definite and firm conviction" 
that the trial court was mistaken. State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 
539 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citations omitted); State v. Ashe, 745 
P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987). However, this Court reviews 
conclusions drawn from the trial court's fact findings as a 
matter of law, giving no deference to the lower court's ruling. 
State v. Caver, No. 900297-CA, slip op. at 7 (Utah Ct. App. June 
25, 1991). 
When a search warrant is challenged as having been 
issued without an adequate showing of probable cause, the 
reviewing court does not conduct a de novo review of the 
magistrate's probable cause determination; instead, the reviewing 
court determines only whether the magistrate had a substantial 
basis for concluding that probable cause existed. State v. 
Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1989). The reviewing court 
should pay "great deference" to the magistrate's decision. Ibid. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies is included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Foster M. Leonard, was charged with two 
counts of possession of a controlled substance, to wit, ephedrine 
and hydriodic acid, second degree felonies, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37c-4(b) (Supp. 1991); possession of equipment 
with intent to manufacture a controlled substance, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37c-8 (Supp. 1991); 
conspiracy to manufacture a controlled substance, to wit, 
methamphetamine, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 58-37-8 (Supp. 1991) and 76-4-201 (1990) and giving false 
information to a police officer, a class C misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-507 (Supp. 1991) (Record 
[hereinafter R.] at 12-13). 
Following the trial court's denial of his motions to 
suppress evidence, defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty 
to the charges of possession of equipment with intent to 
manufacture a controlled substance and conspiracy to manufacture 
a controlled substance, as third degree felonies, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37c-8 (Supp. 1991) and Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-
37-8 (Supp. 1991) and 76-4-201 (1990) (R. at 44, 51, 65, 113-21 
(motions to suppress), 151-58 (statement of defendant), 108-12 
(trial court's ruling)). 
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Defendant was subsequently sentenced to not more than 
five years on each count and ordered to pay a $1,000 fine on each 
count, sentences to run concurrently (R. at 189-87 )• 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
For purposes of the issues raised on appeal, the 
pertinent facts are those set out in the trial court's ruling (R. 
at 108-112) .l The Court's findings of fact and conclusions of 
law are as follows: 
[1] From approximately May 1, 1989, law 
enforcement agencies had been conducting 
surveillance at Intertech Chemical in Orem[,] 
Utah. The surveillance has resulted in a 
number of arrests and convictions. On July 
20, 1989, Detective Terry Fox was conducting 
surveillance at Intertech. He noticed 
defendant Leonard in the parking lot wearing 
casual clothes and using what appeared to be 
a personal vehicle rather than a company 
vehicle. Leonard behaved in a nervous 
manner. He purchased what looked to the 
detective to be glassware and chemicals and 
appeared to pay in cash. Defendants loaded 
the glassware and chemicals in to the vehicle 
and left the parking lot. 
[2] Detective Fox decided to follow the 
vehicle in order to identify its owner. As 
Fox attempted to follow the vehicle, another 
car swerved in front of Fox in an apparent 
attempt to disrupt his progress. It appeared 
to Fox that the defendants' vehicle was 
trying to evade pursuit. Fox noted reckless 
behavior on the part of the defendants as 
they turned to get on the freeway that nearly 
caused an accident. On the freeway, the 
defendants' accelerated to over 70 miles per 
hour in a 55 miles per hour zone. 
1
 Defendant does not appear to dispute the trial court's 
findings; rather, defendant challenges the credibility of the 
officers who testified at the motion to suppress hearing (Br. of 
App. at 5-6). 
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[3] Detective Fox called for back up after a 
check through dispatch found no owner 
registered for either the plates of the 
defendants' vehicle nor for the vehicle that 
swerved in front of him* The vehicle was 
stopped without incident after the backup 
arrived.2 The officers on the scene then 
arrested the defendants and gave the 
appropriate Miranda warnings. Defendants 
were interviewed separately concerning what 
they had purchased and the purpose for which 
they had purchased it. They gave the 
officers different stories—but both 
indicated that they were purchasing the 
equipment for someone else. Defendant 
Leonard at first gave a false identification 
and date of birth. Over $2,000 was found in 
defendant Garza's purse. 
[4] Prior to the arrest of the defendants 
and the search of the vehicle, the officers 
had made contact with Intertech and were told 
what the defendants had purchased.3 The 
items found in the vehicle—including 
glassware and chemicals—matched the 
description of the merchandise given by 
Intertech. The vehicle contained items 
frequently used in the manufacture of 
methamphetamine. Defendant Garza gave two 
different addresses as her own. After 
checking with Mountain Bell, the officers 
found that one of the addresses given had a 
phone listed in her name. Based upon the 
information given above, a search warrant was 
2
 Based on information provided him by Officer Fox, Officer 
Gary Caldwell of the American Fork Police Department effected the 
stop of the defendants' vehicle (T. at 82-90). The stop was 
based on the officers' belief that defendants were in possession 
of drug paraphernalia, as well as controlled substances (T. at 
53, 56-58, 61, 89-90). 
3
 Although the trial court correctly found that Intertech 
was contacted prior to defendant's arrest, a review of Officer 
Caldwell's testimony at the suppression hearing makes clear that 
the arresting officers received the Intertech information even 
prior to the stop of defendants' vehicle (T. at 33). In 
addition, Officer Caldwell learned that defendants paid cash and 
did not provide Intertech with their names at the time of 
purchase (R. at 7, para. #8; a copy of Officer's Caldwell's 
affidavit is attached hereto as Addendum A). 
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served on defendant Garza's residence. 
Numerous "listed" chemicals and drug 
paraphernalia were found. 
[5] The Court finds that the stop made by 
the officers was appropriate and legal. 
Detective Fox had reasonable suspicion based 
on the circumstances taken as a whole. The 
defendants did not appear to be ordinary 
businessmen; they appeared to be nervous; 
they drove erratically, they used what 
appeared to be a personal vehicle; another 
car seemed to be acting in concert with 
defendants in an attempt to block the 
detective's pursuit; dispatch could not 
identify owner of the vehicle from the 
license plate number; the defendants were 
traveling more than 15 miles per hour in 
excess of the speed limit; the list of items 
purchased given to the officers while in 
pursuit were indicative of illegal activity. 
All of these factors taken together could 
easily create a reasonable and articulateble 
[sic] suspicion necessary to make an 
investigatory stop. 
[6] Defendants were properly given their 
Miranda warnings. Even before the officers 
began investigatory questioning which does 
not require it, defendants were given Miranda 
warnings. Salt Lake City v. earner, 664 P.2d 
1168, 1170 (1983). 
[7] The Court believes the search of the 
defendant's vehicle was proper. The list of 
items purchased from Intertech received while 
the officers were in pursuit, combined with 
the suspicious behavior of the defendants, 
and all attendant circumstances, created 
probable cause for [the] search of the 
vehicle. Even if the search was improper, 
the illegality would not affect the legality 
of the search warrant. The reasoning of the 
Court is that information relative to the 
evidence found in the vehicle was available 
to the officers in the form of a purchase 
order from Intertech. 
[8] The chemicals and equipment found in the 
defendants' vehicle and on the purchase order 
from Intertech were commonly used together in 
the making of methamphe-camine. In fact 
-6-
testimony indicated that the materials found 
lacked only one specialized piece of 
glassware and some other chemicals to allow 
one to easily make methamphetamine. Also, 
such equipment is rarely used in conjunction 
to make anything other than methamphetamine. 
The officers, being aware of the facts above, 
had probable cause to make the arrest. 
[9] The Court believes that there was 
sufficient probable cause for the issuance of 
the search warrant based on the conduct of 
the defendants and the purchase order from 
Intertech. This probable cause was enhanced 
by the statements of the defendants relative 
to the intended use of the supplies obtained 
from Intertech and the false information 
given relative to living quarters and 
identity. 
[10] For the reasons given above, the Court 
finds that the stop of the defendants' 
vehicle, the subsequent questioning of the 
defendants, and the issuance of the search 
warrant were proper. Therefore, the Court 
denies defendantsf'] motion to suppress. 
(R. at 108-12). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant's arguments in points I-III of his brief 
appear to focus on the trial court's assessment of reasonable 
suspicion for the initial stop of defendant's Bronco (Br. of App. 
at 10-13). Specifically, defendant broadly asserts that the 
stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion and therefore the 
subsequent arrest, seizure of contraband, investigatory 
questioning and warrant-based search of his residence were all 
impermissibly tainted (Br. of App. at 10-13). Defendant's 
unsubstantiated and erroneous allegations lack merit as well as 
record support. 
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The stop of defendant's vehicle was supported by a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Prior to 
the stop, investigating officers had observed defendant's and his 
companion's suspicious conduct, including the cash purchase of 
glassware and chemicals commonly used in the illegal manufacture 
of methamphetamine, as well as defendants' evasive and reckless 
driving. Notwithstanding the above, defendant challenges the 
subsequent search of the Bronco and police questioning solely on 
the alleged illegality of the initial stop. However, because the 
initial stop of defendant's vehicle was valid as based on 
reasonable suspicion, defendant's arguments are all equally 
without merit. 
As for defendant's allegations concerning the 
sufficiency of Officer Caldwell's affidavit, a review of the 
record supports the magistrate's finding of probable cause for 
the issuance of the search warrant. Contrary to defendant's 
assertion, the affidavit clearly identified the "source" of 
Officer Caldwell's information which included his and other 
officers' observations of defendant in possession of drug 
paraphernalia. Moreover, because a police officer is generally 
presumed to be reliable, no special showing of the officers' 
reliability is required. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED BY POLICE 
WAS PROPER. 
In point I of his brief on appeal, defendant challenges 
the trial court's determination of reasonable suspicion in 
support of the investigatory stop of defendant's vehicle (Br. of 
App. at 5). Specifically, defendant asserts that the trial court 
erred in relying on the testimony of the officers in assessing 
the facts in support of its determination of reasonable suspicion 
for the stop (Br. of App. at 6-7, 10). Defendant further alleges 
that certain of the trial court's findings were erroneous, and 
that viewing the facts individually, they fail to support the 
trial court's ruling (Br. of App. at 6-9). Defendant's 
unsubstantiated and erroneous allegations are without merit. 
Due to the trial court's "advantageous position in 
determining the factual basis for a motion to suppress," as well 
as to "observe witnesses' demeanor and other factors bearing on 
credibility," this Court will not upset a trial court's 
underlying factual findings unless they appear to be clearly 
erroneous. State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 539 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) (citations omitted); State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 
(Utah 1987). A trial court's findings are not clearly erroneous 
unless they are either against the clear weight of the evidence, 
or this Court reaches a "definite and firm conviction" that the 
trial court was mistaken. Id., (citations omitted). Accordingly, 
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this Court may not disturb the trial court's determination that 
reasonable suspicion existed unless that factual finding is 
clearly erroneous. State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181/ 183 (Utah 
1987); (Utah 1987); State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 137 n.l (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991); State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). But see State v. Carter, No. 900303-CA, slip op. at 
n.6 (Utah Ct. App. May 28, 1991) (amended opinion) (noting the 
Court's confusion on the proper standard of review - i.e., 
whether to treat the trial court's determination of the existence 
of reasonable suspicion as a question of fact or a conclusion of 
law).4 
The "reasonable suspicion" test was first articulated 
by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968). There the Court held that when "a police officer 
observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude 
in light of his experience that criminal activity is afoot," he 
may make an investigative stop to confirm or dispel his 
A
 The State acknowledges that Utah is in the minority with 
Mendoza's requirement that the reasonable suspicion determination 
be reviewed as a finding of fact under a clearly erroneous 
standard. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez - Alvarado, 891 
F.2d 1414, 1416 (9th Cir. 1989) (setting forth the generally held 
view that whether reasonable suspicion exists is a mixed question 
of fact and law, and the trial court's ultimate conclusion 
regarding reasonable suspicion is a legal conclusion which is 
reviewed do novo). In Carter the State plans to seek certiorari 
review by the Utah Supreme Court and to ask that court for 
clarification of the standard of review for reasonable suspicion 
determinations. However, unless and until the Utah Supreme Court 
disavows Mendoza, that decision and its clearly erroneous 
standard of review are binding on this Court. 
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suspicion. Jd. at 30.5 A police officer who makes an 
investigative stop must be able to point to "specific and 
articulable facts which taken together with rational inferences 
from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." .Id. at 21. 
The Terry "reasonable suspicion" test has been codified in Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1990) which reads as follows: 
Any peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has reasonable suspicion 
to believe he has committed or is in the act 
of committing or is attempting to commit a 
public offense and may demand his name, 
address, and an explanation of his actions. 
This Court has interpreted the reasonable suspicion 
test and concluded that a "brief investigatory stop must be based 
on 'objective facts' that the 'individual is involved in criminal 
activity.'" State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 508 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) (citations omitted); Menke, 787 P.2d at 541. 
5
 This Court has previously noted that there are three 
constitutionally permissible levels of police encounters: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at 
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as 
the citizen is not detained against his will; 
(2) an officer may seize a person if the 
officer has an "articulable suspicion" that 
the person has committed or is about to 
commit a crime; however, the "detention must 
be temporary and last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
stop"; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if 
the officer has probable cause to believe an 
offense has been committed or is being 
committed. 
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), rev'd 
on other grounds, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991). 
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The undisputed testimony of the officers at the motion 
to suppress hearing established that members of the North End 
Narcotics Strike Team were conducting an ongoing investigation 
into the establishment and operation of methamphetamine 
laboratories (T. at 9-13, 27, 46, 64-65). As; part of that 
investigation, Officer Fox was conducting a visual surveillance 
of Intertech Trading in Orem, Utah on July 20, 1989 when he 
observed defendant and codefendant, April Garza, purchase 
glassware and chemicals (T. at 10-12, 32). Officer Fox believed 
defendant's behavior was suspiciously inconsistent with the 
actions of a legitimate businessman for several reasons, 
including defendant's casual dress and the absence of a company 
logo on the Bronco, as well as defendant's continuous scanning of 
the parking lot before lifting up the front of his shirt and 
reaching down his pants to remove something (T. at 10-12, 27-29). 
While Officer Fox watched, boxes depicting glass flasks (which 
appeared to be the same size and shape as glassware boxes Officer 
Fox had observed during previous investigations), as well as 
gallon containers of some type of chemical, were loaded into the 
back of the Bronco (T. at 11-13). 
As the Bronco, driven by defendant, pulled out of the 
Intertech parking lot, Officer Fox attempted to get the license 
plate number of the vehicle (T. at 13). As he attempted to 
follow defendant's Bronco, Officer Fox was intercepted by a cream 
colored Datsun parked against traffic on the wrong side of the 
road (T. at 13). After forcing Officer Fox to brake in order to 
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avoid hitting it, the Datsun fell in behind the Bronco, in front 
of Officer Fox's vehicle (T. at 14). Upon reaching the 1-15 
northbound on-ramp, Officer Fox observed the Bronco fail to yield 
the right of way to another vehicle, forcing the other vehicle 
off the road into the barrow pit (T. at 14). At the same time, 
the Datsun slammed on its brakes and began weaving an S-pattern 
in front of Officer Fox's vehicle (T. at 14). As he continued 
following the Bronco northbound on 1-15, Officer Fox observed 
several additional evasive tactics by defendant including 
speeding and illegal lane changes (T. at 15-17). He also 
observed defendant apparently attempt to signal the Datsun by 
putting bandanna-type flags out both windows of the Bronco (T. at 
16). A subsequent registration check on both the Bronco and 
Datsun prior to the stop revealed that neither set of plates were 
"on file" (T. at 15). 
Officer Caldwell, who had been called for back-up 
assistance, then contacted Intertech in an effort to determine 
what defendant and his companion had purchased (T. at 33, 96). 
Intertech informed Officer Caldwell what they had purchased, that 
they paid cash and that they had not given their names at the 
time of purchase (R. at 7, para. #8; see Addendum A). Based on 
information received from Intertech, as well as the personal 
observations of Officer Fox and defendant's reckless, evasive 
driving, Officer Caldwell stopped defendant's vehicle (T. at 35-
38, 53, 61, 66). As he approached to talk to defendant, Officer 
Caldwell observed heating panels, heating units, glassware, 
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stirring rods, boxes of rubber gloves and color blast testing 
strips in plain view in the Bronco (T. at 69), Due to his 
experience in the investigation of controlled substances and 
their manufacture, Officer Caldwell was able to identify these 
objects as the type commonly used in the unlawful manufacture of 
methamphetamine (T. at 69-71). 
Based on the foregoing, the stop of defendant's Bronco 
was supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. As 
has been recognized by this Court, trained police officers "may 
be able to perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct which 
would be wholly innocent to the untrained observer. . . . " 
Menke, 787 P.2d at 541. Thus, an officer is "entitled to assess 
the facts in light of his experience." .Id. (citations omitted). 
Moreover, contrary to defendant's apparent assertion, an 
officer's assessment of reasonable suspicion depends not on 
isolated facts, but upon the totality of the circumstances. 
State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Because the investigating officers in this case were able to 
articulate their suspicions and identify the facts upon which 
they were based, and because those suspicions were justified by 
the totality of the circumstances confronting the officers, this 
Court should affirm that the stop of defendant's vehicle was 
lawful* The court's reasonable suspicion determination was not 
clearly erroneous. Id. 
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POINT II 
THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE WAS PROPER 
UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT. 
As previously noted, defendant's arguments in points 
II-III concerning the subsequent search of the Bronco and police 
questioning, appear to be nothing more than an extenuation of his 
argument in point I, without sufficient factual development (Br. 
of App. at 10-11). Defendant appears to assert that the officers 
lacked sufficient reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant 
and his companion were engaged in illegal activity prior to 
stopping the Bronco; therefore, the subsequent vehicle search, as 
well as police questioning, were allegedly invalid and any 
contraband seized, or information gained therefrom, should be 
suppressed pursuant to Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 
(1963). As before, defendant's broad and unsubstantiated 
allegations are without merit. 
The trial court found that there was probable cause for 
the search of defendant's Bronco. Specifically, the Court 
stated: 
The Court believes the search of the 
defendants' vehicle was proper. The list of 
items purchased from Intertech received while 
the officers were in pursuit, combined with 
the suspicious behavior of the defendants, 
and all attendant circumstances, created 
probable cause for [sic] search of the 
vehicle. 
(R. at 111, para. # 7 ) . Although the trial court determined that 
the search of defendant's vehicle was supported by probable 
cause, the court's ruling does not expressly state which 
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exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment it 
was applying. Admittedly, a search and seizure conducted without 
a warrant is unreasonable per se unless it falls within a 
recognized exception to the warrant requirement. State v. 
Bartlev, 784 P.2d 1231, 1235 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citation 
omitted); Menke, 787 P.2d at 543. However, the search of 
defendant's vehicle was justified under the automobile exception 
to the warrant requirement first articulated in Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132, 151-52 (1925). The Carroll Court 
determined that a warrantless search of an automobile was 
permissable if the searching officers "have probable cause to 
believe that the automobile contains either contraband or 
evidence of a crime and that they may be lost if not immediately 
seized." State v. Droneburq, 781 P.2d 1303, 1305 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) (quoting State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 411 (Utah 
1984))- See Chambers v. Maronev, 399 U.S. 42 (1975). See also 
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985); United States v. Ross, 
456 U.S. 798 (1982); State v. Dorsev, 731 P.2d 1085, 1087-88 
(Utah 1986).6 Thus, where as here, a vehicle is lawfully 
stopped based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and 
6
 Because defendant has neither raised nor requested a 
separate state constitutional analysis under article I, section 
14 of the Utah Constitution, the State's argument is based solely 
on the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution and 
thus; does not address the plurality opinion in State v. Larocco, 
794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) which held that under article I, section 
14 of the Utah Constitution, warrantless searches are permissible 
"only where they satisfy their traditional justification, namely, 
to protect the safety of police or the public or to prevent the 
destruction of evidence." Id. at 469-70. 
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officers observe contraband which may be lost if not immediately 
seized, the Carroll doctrine would justify an immediate and 
warrantless search. State v. Limb, 581 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 
1978). See Christensen, 676 P.2d at 411. See also State v. 
Hvcrh, 711 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah 1985). 
Reviewing all the information available to the officers 
in light of the circumstances as they existed at the time of the 
search, the evidence shows that the officers had ample 
information available to establish probable cause that there was 
contraband in the vehicle and to justify an immediate warrantless 
search of the Bronco. 
Officers Caldwell and Fox testified that they observed 
drug paraphernalia and chemicals in plain view in the back of 
defendant's Bronco at the time of the stop (T. at 19, 69). 
Specifically, Officer Fox testified that he observed gallon 
containers and glass flasks of chemical in an open box in the 
back of the Bronco (T. at 19). Officer Caldwell testified that 
he observed glassware, heating panels and units, stirring rods, 
color blast testing strips and rubber gloves (T. at 69). These 
observations, together with the suspicious behavior of defendant 
and his companion at the time they purchased the glassware and 
chemicals, the information from Intertech concerning the 
purchased items, as well as defendant's evasive and reckless 
driving prior to the stop, all support the trial court's apparent 
determination that there was probable cause to associate the drug 
paraphernalia and chemicals observed in the Bronco with the 
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suspected illegal manufacture of methamphetamine. See Menke, 7 87 
P.2d at 544 (contraband seized was the anticipated fruit of the 
suspected theft). Thus, in summary, defendant was lawfully 
stopped and investigated, probable cause existed for the search 
of the Bronco, and the warrantless search was justified under the 
automobile exception. Therefore, the trial court did not err in 
denying defendant's motion to suppress and this Court should 
affirm the lower court's ruling on this ground. See State v. 
Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 1986) (Court may affirm trial 
court's decision to admit evidence on any proper ground). 
As for defendant's allegation in point III, he vaguely 
asserts that information obtained through police questioning was 
tainted and therefore "inadmissable" because it followed the 
alleged illegal stop of defendant's Bronco (Br. of App. at 11). 
Significantly, defendant does not attack the trial court's 
findings in regard to the propriety of police questioning 
following his arrest. The trial court specifically held that 
[t]he officers on the scene [] arrested the 
defendants and gave the appropriate Miranda 
warnings. Defendants were interviewed 
separately concerning what they had purchased 
and the purpose for which they had purchased 
it. They gave the officers different 
stories—but both indicated that they were 
purchasing the equipment for someone else. 
. . . 
Defendants were properly given their 
Miranda warnings. Even before the officers 
began investigatory questioning which does 
not require it, defendants were given Miranda 
warnings. 
(R. at 109, 111, supra pp. 5-7 para. ## 3, 6). 
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As previously noted in point I, it is the State's 
position that the stop of defendant's Bronco was valid pursuant 
to the officers' reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; thus, 
subsequent events were not tainted thereby. Because defendant 
has not presented additional argument, legal analysis, authority 
or record support for his allegations, the State will not further 
address defendant's argument on this point. Moreover, 
defendant's minimal and conclusory analysis does not merit review 
by this Court. State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 
1984); State v. Stercrer, 808 P.2d 122, 125 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991) (court declined to rule on defendant's arguments due in 
part to his failure to provide any meaningful analysis). 
POINT III 
THE AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF THE SEARCH 
WARRANT WAS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE 
CAUSE FOR THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S 
RESIDENCE. 
In point IV of his brief defendant appears to assert 
that Officer Caldwell's affidavit in support of a search warrant 
for defendant's residence was insufficient to establish probable 
cause (Br. of App. at 11-12). Specifically, defendant asserts 
that w[n]othing contained in either the affidavit or in the 
transcript of the hearing reveals any claim to a source, whether 
confidential or otherwise, which claims to have seen any 
contraband or other evidence of criminal conduct" (Br. of App. at 
13). Defendant's meritless allegations are unsupported by the 
record. 
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It is well established that a finding of "probable 
cause supported by oath or affirmation" is required for the 
issuance of a search warrant. State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284, 285 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citations omitted). It is equally clear 
that whether an affidavit in support of a search warrant 
established probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant 
is determined by the totality of the circumstances. State v. 
Avala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citing Illinois 
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), and State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 
1258 (Utah 1983) (adopting Gates analysis)), cert, denied, 773 
P.2d 45 (Utah 1989). In determining whether the issuing 
magistrate reached a practical, common sense decision that there 
is "probable cause to believe that evidence is located in a 
particular place," the reviewing court does not conduct a "de 
novo probable-cause determination;" rather, the reviewing court 
determines whether the evidence viewed as a whole" provides a 
"'substantial basis' for the finding of probable cause." JA. at 
1109-10 (citing Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 732-733 
(1984)); Brown, 798 P.2d at 286 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 230, 
State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 1987), and State v. 
Droneburg, 781 P-2d 1303, 1306 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). In so 
determining, the reviewing court should pay "great deference to 
the magistrate's decision." State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 991 
(Utah 1989). A review of Officer Caldwell's affidavit 
accordingly reveals a "substantial basis" for the magistrate's 
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determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search 
warrant for defendant's residence. 
As previously noted, defendant's primary challenge to 
the affidavit appears to be that it failed to identify a "source" 
for the information contained therein (Br. of App. at 13). 
However, contrary to defendant's assertion, the "source" of 
Officer Caldwell's information was clearly stated in the 
affidavit (R. at 70-72, see Addendum A). Specifically, Officer 
Caldwell relied upon his own and Officer Fox's investigation and 
observations of defendant's conduct (R. at 70-72, see Addendum 
A). 7 As set forth in the affidavit, Officer Fox observed 
defendant and his companion load drug paraphernalia into their 
vehicle at Intertech (R. at 72, see Addendum A). He then relayed 
that information to Officer Caldwell in a request for backup 
assistance, who then contacted Intertech to find out what 
defendant had purchased (R. at 71-72, see Addendum A). Based on 
the information he received from Intertech, as well as 
defendant's reckless and evasive driving, Officer Caldwell 
determined that defendants had purchased prohibited drug 
paraphernalia with the intent to manufacture the controlled 
substances (R. at 71, see Addendum A). 
7
 Because a police officer is generally presumed to be 
reliable, no special showing of either Officer Caldwell's or 
Officer Fox's reliability is required here. 3 W. LaFave, Search 
and Seizure § 3.5(a), p. 3 (1987) (citing United States v. 
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965)). Cf. State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 
1363, 1366 (Utah Ct. App.) (average neighbor witness is not the 
type of informant in need of independent proof of reliability or 
veracity) (citations omitted), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 
1987). 
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As further stated in his affidavit, Officer Caldwell 
subsequently interviewed both defendant and his companion and 
received conflicting stories concerning an individual who 
allegedly asked them to purchase the paraphernalia on his behalf 
(R. at 70-71, see Addendum A). Officer Caldwell also ran a 
criminal history on codefendant Garza and learned that she had 
previously been arrested for conspiracy to manufacture 
methamphetamine and conspiracy to distribute and possess 
methamphetamine• See State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 57 (Utah 
Ct. App.) (probable cause determination supported by information 
that defendant had previously been convicted of a similar 
offense), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). Based on the 
foregoing information, Officer Caldwell determined that defendant 
and his companion were "not being honest" with him and that, 
contrary to their assertions, they were in fact themselves 
manufacturing and distributing methamphetamine in their residence 
and that a search of that residence would reveal additional 
paraphernalia (R. at 70, see Addendum A). Thus, contrary to 
defendant's assertion, Officer Caldwell's affidavit provided a 
substantial basis for the magistrate's determination of probable 
cause to believe that contraband would be discovered inside 
defendant's residence. Therefore, this Court should affirm the 
trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress on this 
ground. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing reasons, the order of the trial 
court denying defendant's motion to suppress should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /[r day of July, 1991. 
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ADDENDUM A 
CIRCUIT COT,!Vr, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMr'lT 
DTAH COU1JTY, STATE OF DTAH 
******************** ***************************************** 
PROBAELE CAUSE 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 
OF AND MOTION FOR A 
SEARCH WARRANT 
CASE NO. 
A * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
1. Gary Caldwell
 f being first duly sworn on 
oath/ deposes and says; 
2. That I am a police officer for American Fork Police 
Department, American Fork, Utah, Utah County, State 
of Ut;h. 
3. That I have been a police officer for the past cen years. 
I have been working with a narcotics task force as a 
supervisor for the past two years. I have experience in 
serving as many as 100 search warrants during the past eight 
years. I have arrested many people for narcotics violations 
during the same period of time 
4. I have been to narcotics training classes during the past 
two years to train me in working with different types of 
narcotics cases. One of the classes dealt with methamphetimines 
and how people operate labs. I have been trained in all 
aspects of the operation of and the way people operate in 
order to set a lab up. 
5. In the past three months I have had experience in arresting 
as many as twelve persons who have been involved in manufacturing 
methamphetimine labs. I have found and located meth labs 
in houses and vehicles. I have seen the equipment used and 
the method of operation. 
6. On July 20th, 1989 at 1400 hours, Lt. Fox of the American 
Fork Police Department observed a blue 1980 Bronco with Utah 
Plates # 023 DAD pick up items from Intertech Trading in 
Orem, Utah at 170 South Mtn. Way Dr. The itmes he could see 
being loaded appeared to be paraphrenlia items used in a 
methamphetimine lab. Lt. Fox contacted your affiant at the 
American Fork Police Dept. and told me what he had seen. He 
was asked to follow the vehicle until I could determine who 
the person picking the itmes up was. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
-VS-
OCCUPANTS OF 56QLQ S o ^ h 
1291 East 
Mu: 
I was able to determine that the items picked up were items 
listed on the House Bill # 3 as paraphrenlia items. I believe 
that based on the actions of the two suspects in the vehicle 
and the items purchased by cash from Intertech Trading that 
the two persons knew that the items were going or were probably 
going to a meth lab. 
The actions were that the two suspects hid the itmes in the 
rear of the vehicle they were driving. They did not gine any 
names at the time of purchase. They picked up items listed 
on House Bill #3 and other items we believe are used to manu 
facture meth. They had some one other than the registered 
owner drive the vehicle. 
At approximately 1400 hours, your affiant stopped the suspect 
vehicle and advised the driver of his rights. He told your affiar 
that he was paid to come to Orem by a man he knows as "Fatso" 
and pick up the paraphrenlia items. He told me that he 
was to take the items to Salt Lake Cith to a motel, rent a 
room and call the guy at a pay phone booth and he would come 
pick up the chemicals and glass ware, he told me that he was 
given $540.00 cash to pay for the items. 
Your affiant interviewed the female suspect at the American 
Fork Police Department and she told your affiant that she 
met a man in a business in Salt Lake City two months ago. 
She told me that the man she knows as Mike Shriver is 
from California and he gave-her $2,000.00 in cash to go to 
Orem to pick the chemicals and paraphrenlia items up. She 
said they were to take the items to Salt Lake to a Motel 
and rent it for three days and put the key on top of the 
pay phone outside.The suspect was to call her at her house 
and she would tell him where the key was and he would pick 
the items up. 
Your affiant believes that there is probable cause to believe 
that both suspects were in possession of drug paraphrenlia 
with intent to manufacture Methamphetamines. Your affiant 
ran a criminal history on April Garza and found that 
she has been in prison in California and possible Oregon. I 
found that.she had family in Oregon. I learned that she has 
been arrested for Conspiracy to Manufacture Methamphetamines 
Conspracy to Dist. and Poss Methamphetamines . She also 
has a arrest for assault on a police officer with a firearm. 
Your affiant interviewed April and Leonard, the two suspects 
and both of them gave your affiant an address in Salt Lake 
City. April gave your affiant this address also and said she 
lived here too. I asked her which address she really lived at 
and she gave me the 5600 South 1291 East #6. I was able to 
have her give me her phone number. She stated the number was 
the number registered to the stated address. I called Mary 
at Mtn. Bell and she told me that the phone number given to 
your affiant was registered to April at 5600 South 1291 East 
#6 in Murray,Utah 
7 
13. Your affiant sent Det. Blackhurst and Det. Taylor from Orem 
Police to Murray: to the stated address, and they located 
a 280 Z car which is registered to April. The car is parked 
right in front of the stated residence. Your affiant was 
told by Blackhurst that the mail box in front ofthe residence 
had the name of April and Leonard on it. 
14. Your affiant believes that the two listed suspects have not 
been honest with me and that they in fact may the ones 
making or manufacturing or distributing methamphetannines. That 
they in fact live at the stated address at 5600 South 1291 East 
#6. 
15. Your affiant believes that the two suspects are or may be 
in possession of controlled substances in the residence which 
have been manufactured by glass ware and items the same as 
we seized. Your affiant believes that the two suspects will 
be in possession of items used to distribute or manufacture 
controlled substances, and that they will be in possession 
of items used to identify them and their sources for the 
sale or distribution of controlled substances. 
16. Your affiant believes that because of the evidence found 
already and the criminal history of April and because of 
the type of items involved in the use and manufacturing of 
methamphetimines that there is a serious danger to the officers 
serving the search warrant. April is not in the house, but 
in the Utah County Jail, however, anyone could be in the stated 
residence. 
17. Therefore, Your affiant respectfully request a warrant to 
search the stated residence and to enter the residence without 
first giving notice of our'presence and intent to enter. 
„i/^y 
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